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Abstract
Part I of this Comment will lay out the potential arguments the United States could make
to justify its engagement against ISIS under international law, jus ad bellum. This Part will also
present existing commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of the available legal justifications.
Part II will lay out the legal justifications under US law and discuss their nexus to the United
States’ international obligations. Finally, Part III will argue that the United States’ engagement
is appropriately classified as an instance of collective self-defense under international law. This
Part will discuss what new AUMF would be needed in order to be consistent with United States
international law obligations.
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INTRODUCTION
The stone walls of the Great Mosque in Mosul, Iraq are over
eight centuries old.2 On a balmy July afternoon in 2014, these historic
walls encircled the new leader of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(“ISIS”), shrouded in black robes, as he prepared to give his first
formal address as the self-proclaimed caliph.3 That day, children
looked on as cars burned in Mosul’s streets.4 Black clouds of smoke
ballooned above homes and the carcasses of police cars sat ablaze on
highways.5 The Iraqi military had “crumbled” at the hands of the
jihadists, who roamed the villages brandishing weapons.6 Families
fled and Iraqi soldiers shed their uniforms as Islamic State militants

2. Great Mosque, Mosul, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/
place/Great-Mosque-Mosul-Iraq (discussing the age and location of the Great Mosque of
Mosul); see also Mosul – Minaret of the Great Mosque of Nur al-Din, CULTURAL PROPERTY
TRAINING RESOURCE, http://cchag.org/html/09476/iraq05-047.html (last visited Aug. 20,
2015) (discussing the history of the Great Mosque).
3. See Isis Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Appears in First Video, BBC NEWS (July 5,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28177848 (showing a video recording of
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s sermon in the Great Mosque at Mosul); Hannah Strange, Islamic
State Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Addresses Muslims in Mosul, THE TELEGRAPH (July 5,
2014), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10948480/Islamic-Stateleader-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi-addresses-Muslims-in-Mosul.html (discussing the ISIS leader’s
sermon at the Mosul Great Mosque).
4. See Suadad al-Salhy and Tim Arango, Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army Out of Mosul,
N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/militantsin-mosul.html (describing the destruction of Mosul and showing a photograph of children
beside a burning car); see also Robert Mackey, Glimpses of Mosul in Islamist Hands on
YouTube, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/11/world/middleeast/
glimpses-of-mosul-in-islamist-hands-on-youtube.html (describing a YouTube video where
police cars are seen burning and abandoned).
5. See Mackey, supra note 4 and accompanying text; see also al-Salhy & Arango, supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
6. See al-Salhy & Arango, supra note 4 and accompanying text; Mackey, supra note 4
and accompanying text.

2015]

THE PEN AND THE SWORD

135

robbed banks and overtook police stations.7 Flying over Mosul’s
government buildings was the black flag of Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria.8
After the Islamic State had taken Mosul, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
climbed the ancient steps to a podium in the city’s most treasured
landmark to give his first sermon as leader.9 He placed his left hand
below his ribs as he approached the podium in the Great Mosque.10
He raised his eyes to his audience and his hand curled into a fist as he
declared the Islamic State a caliphate. “God has granted your
brothers, the mujahideen, a victory.”11
The fall of Mosul into the hands of the Islamic State marked a
turning point in the United States’ foreign policy, necessitating both a
military strategy and a legal justification for it.12 This Comment will
evaluate the applicable legal arguments under international and US
law for justifying the engagement against ISIS, paying special
attention to the use of an Authorization for Use of Military Force
(“AUMF”).
First, in crafting a military response to the threat
posed by ISIS, the United States had to reconcile its obligations under
international laws of war with its own laws constraining military
engagement.13 The legality of the US engagement against ISIS and
the manner in which this engagement was carried out remain hotly
contested.14 In order to explore the legal justifications for engagement
7. See al-Salhy & Arango, supra note 4 and accompanying text; Mackey, supra note 4
and accompanying text.
8. Martin Chulov, Isis Insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi city of Mosul, THE GUARDIAN,
June 10, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamicmilitants-seize-control-mosul (stating that the black flag of ISIS was raised above civic
buildings); see al-Salhy & Arango, supra note 4 and accompanying text.
9. See Isis Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Appears in First Video, supra note 3 and
accompanying text; Strange, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
10. See Isis Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Appears in First Video, supra note 3 and
accompanying text; Strange, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
11. See Isis Chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Appears in First Video, supra note 3 and
accompanying text; Strange, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Chulov, supra note 8 (stating that Baghdad asked Washington for “missiles
and artillery.”); Faith Karimi and Laura Smith-Spark, ISIS Militants Still Pressing Forward in
Iraq, CNN NEWS (June 14, 2014, 5:56 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/06/13/world/meast/
iraq-violence/ (stating that “the spreading violence prompted U.S. President Barack Obama to
say the beleaguered government required assistance”).
13. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art II. See generally, U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
14. See, e.g., Charlie Savage, White House Invites Congress to Approve ISIS Strikes, But
Says it Isn’t Necessary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/11/
world/middleeast/white-house-invites-congress-to-approve-isis-strikes-but-says-it-isntnecessary.html (quoting competing opinions by scholars on the legality of engagement against
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against ISIS, some background on the United States’ response to ISIS
is necessary.
When ISIS took power in the summer of 2014, the White House
and US President Barack Obama began devising a plan to respond to
the growing military violence in Iraq.15 The response did not involve
a formal declaration of war by Congress.16 Instead, it was an
executive action that consisted of three main “legs:” air strikes in Iraq,
the arming of Syrian rebels, and the formation of an international
coalition.17
The need for military engagement against ISIS grew out of the
rampant violence, growing territorial dominion, and the humanitarian
crisis of the Yazidis.18 The Yazidis, an ethno-religious group in Iraq,
were victims of persecution and ethnic cleansing by ISIS militants in
the summer of 2014.19 As ISIS grew in power, the Yazidis fled to a

ISIS); Spencer Ackerman, Obama’s Legal Rationale for ISIS Strikes: Shoot First, Ask
Congress Later, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 10, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/
sep/11/obama-isis-syria-air-strikes-legal-argument (arguing against the use of the 2001 AUMF
as legal justification for engaging against ISIS).
15. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Speech on ISIL (Aug. 7, 2014)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/07/statementpresident) [hereinafter Speech on ISIL] (announcing the response to ISIS); Senior
Administration Official, Background Conference Call on the President’s Address to the Nation
(Sep. 10, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/
09/10/background-conference-call-presidents-address-nation) (explaining the planned military
response to ISIS).
16. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Speech on Combating ISIS and
Terrorism (Sep. 10, 2014) (transcript available at http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/10/politics/
transcript-obama-syria-isis-speech/) [hereinafter Speech on Combating ISIS] (calling on
Congress to grant further authority to engage against ISIS); Josh Earnest, White House Press
Secretary, The White House, Press Briefing (Sep. 12, 2014) (transcript available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/12/press-briefing-press-secretary-joshearnest-9122014) (stating that congressional authority is not required and asserting the
President’s inherent powers).
17. Speech on Combating ISIS, supra note 16 and accompanying text; Senior
Administration Official, supra note 15 (explaining the three legs of the planned military
response to ISIS); Earnest, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
18. Speech on ISIL, supra note 15 (announcing the need for humanitarian aid to civilians
trapped on a mountain in Iraq); Raya Jalabi, Who Are the Yazidis and Why is ISIS Hunting
Them, THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 11, 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/07/whoyazidi-isis-iraq-religion-ethnicity-mountains (detailing the rampant violence of ISIS against
the Yazidis); Kathy Gilsinan, The Many Ways to Map the Islamic ‘State’, THE ATLANTIC,
Aug. 27, 2014, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/08/the-many-ways-tomap-the-islamic-state/379196/ (describing the territorial expansion of ISIS).
19. Speech on ISIL, supra note 15 (announcing the need for humanitarian aid to civilians
trapped on a mountain in Iraq); Jalabi, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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mountain in Iraq where they awaited near-certain death by
encroaching ISIS militants.20
In light of the Yazidi humanitarian crisis, President Obama cited
humanitarian intervention as the first justification for engagement
against ISIS.21 In a statement given on August 7, 2014, President
Obama authorized two operations in Iraq.22 These operations
consisted of “targeted airstrikes to protect our American personnel,
and a humanitarian effort to help save thousands of Iraqi civilians
who are trapped on a mountain without food and water and facing
almost certain death.” 23
While humanitarian intervention was the first justification given
by the Obama Administration, this justification waned and was
eclipsed by other legal arguments.24 One argument put forth by the
Obama Administration was that the President could authorize
engagement against ISIS under the 2001 Authorization for Use of

20. Isabel Coles & Saif Zamir, Islamic State advances against Yazidis on Iraq’s Sinjar
mountain, REUTERS, Oct. 21, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/21/us-mideastcrisis-iraq-sinjar-idUSKCN0IA1ZQ20141021 (describing the ISIS persecution of the Yazidis
on Mount Sinjar); Jalabi, supra note 18 and accompanying text.
21. Speech on ISIL, supra note 15 (announcing the need for a humanitarian reaction to
the Yazidi crisis); see Louis Henkin, Kosovo and the Law of Humanitarian Intervention, 93
AM. J. INT’L L. 824, 824 (1999) (discussing the legal implications of humanitarian
intervention); see also Paul R. Williams & Meghan E. Stewart, Humanitarian Intervention:
The New Missing Link In the Fight to Prevent Crimes Against Humanity and Genocide?, 40
CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 97, 98 (2008) (providing an overview of requirements for the
humanitarian intervention classification).
22. Speech on ISIL, supra note 15 (authorizing two operations in Iraq); Helene Cooper,
Mark Landler, & Alissa J. Rubin, Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on ISIS, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
7,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/middleeast/obama-weighs-militarystrikes-to-aid-trapped-iraqis-officials-say.html (discussing airstrikes authorized by President
Obama against ISIS).
23. Speech on ISIL, supra note 15 (authorizing targeted airstrikes against ISIS); Jeremy
Stahl, President Obama Authorizes Airstrikes in Iraq, SLATE, Aug. 7, 2014, http://www.slate.
com/blogs/the_slatest/2014/08/07/airstrikes_in_iraq_president_barack_obama_announces_
authorization_of_strikes.html (summarizing the President’s authorization of targeted airstrikes
against ISIS).
24. See, e.g., Earnest, supra note 16 (stating that the President can legally engage ISIS
without congressional authorization); see also Senior Administration Official, supra note 15
(answering a question about the legal grounds for engagement with ISIS by asserting the
President’s statutory and constitutional authority).
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Military Force (“2001 AUMF”).25 However, no clear justification
under international law was offered.26
In order for the US engagement against ISIS to be justified, the
United States must comply with international law as well as with its
own laws.27 The instant analysis will address US legal constraints
dealing primarily with presidential war powers under the U.S.
Constitution.28 Constitutionally, the President can only authorize
military engagement in two cases.29 Either the President must have
statutory authority from Congress in the form of an AUMF, or the
engagement must be inherent in the President’s War Powers under
Article II of the U.S. Constitution.30 In this case, the Obama
Administration argued the former.31 Critics pushed back on this,
arguing that the legal justifications given by White House lawyers
were entirely incorrect.32 Some have argued that the 2001 AUMF was
too outdated to serve as statutory authority in the current conflict.33
Other critics argue that it is problematic for federalism, dealing too

25. Earnest, supra note 16 (stating that the President has authority to engage ISIS under
the 2001 AUMF); Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as the
source for the President’s authority to conduct airstrikes against ISIS).
26. Earnest, supra note 16 (stating that the President has authority to engage ISIS under
the 2001 AUMF but not giving a justification under international law); Senior Administration
Official, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as the source for the President’s authority to
conduct air strikes against ISIS and omitting any discussion of international law justifications).
27. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2(4); U.S. CONST. art. II; War Powers Resolution of 1973,
50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006).
28. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. II; War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541
(2006).
29. U.S. CONST. art. II.
30. Id.
31. Earnest, supra note 16 (stating that the President has authority to engage ISIS under
the 2001 AUMF); Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as the
source of the President’s authority to conduct airstrikes against ISIS).
32. Krishnadev Calamur, Obama Has Support for Syria Strikes, But Are They Legal?,
NPR, Sept. 25, 2014, http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/09/25/351433505/obama-hassupport-for-syria-strikes-but-are-they-legal (quoting several critiques of the Administrations
use of the 2001 AUMF); see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Obama’s Betrayal of the Constitution,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/opinion/obamas-betrayal-ofthe-constitution.html (arguing that the Obama Administration’s legal justification for fighting
ISIS was incorrect).
33. See, e.g., Ankit Panda, A Bad Idea: Using the 2001 AUMF as Legal Rationale For
Striking ISIS, THE DIPLOMAT, Sept. 11, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/a-bad-ideausing-the-2001-aumf-as-legal-rationale-for-striking-isis/ (arguing that the 2001 AUMF should
have been repealed); see also Paul Kawika Martin, Is There An Alternative to War with ISIS?,
MSNBC, Feb. 12, 2015, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/alternative-war-isis (asserting that the
2001 AUMF is outdated and should be repealed).
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broad a grant of power to the executive branch.34 Some critique the
use of the 2001 AUMF on grounds of legislative intent, arguing that it
was intended to apply to al-Qaeda, not ISIS.35
In addition to being legally sound under its own laws, the United
States’ engagement must be in compliance with international law
since the United States is party to the United Nations Charter and sits
on the United Nations Security Council.36 In international law, there
are two branches of the laws of war that would apply to the United
States in military engagement: jus ad bellum and jus in bello.37 The
first deals with legal justifications for going to war and the second
deals with the laws that govern the combat itself.38 The instant
analysis will focus primarily on the former as it applies to the US
justifications for engaging against ISIS. Moreover, this Comment will
evaluate the legal tools in the US executive toolbox, specifically
focusing on the US obligations under the UN Charter as well as under
US law.
Part I of this Comment will lay out the potential arguments the
United States could make to justify its engagement against ISIS under
international law, jus ad bellum. This Part will also present existing
commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of the available legal
justifications. Part II will lay out the legal justifications under US law
and discuss their nexus to the United States’ international obligations.
34. Jack Goldsmith, Obama’s Breathtaking Expansion of a President’s Power to Make
War, TIME, Sept. 11, 2014, http://time.com/3326689/obama-isis-war-powers-bush/ (arguing
that the 2001 AUMF is too expansive a grant of executive power); Bruce Ackerman, supra
note 32 (arguing that President Obama went beyond his Constitutional powers in engaging
against ISIS in this manner). For a discussion of the tension between the executive and
legislative branches in matters of national security, see Celidon Pitt, Fair Trade: The
President’s Power to Recover Captured U.S. Servicemembers and the Recent Prisoner
Exchange with the Taliban, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2837, 2841 (2015) (discussing the Bergdahl
prisoner exchange as “most recent example of the tension between the executive and
legislative branches over the conduct and funding of national security–related matters”).
35. Brett Logiurato, Congressman: Obama’s Expansion of His ISIS Campaign Is
‘Illegal’, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 24, 2014, 3:38 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
obama-isis-legal-aumf-congress-2014-9 (arguing that ISIS is not connected to perpetrators of
9/11 and cannot be fought under the 2001 AUMF); Ackerman, supra note 32 (arguing that
ISIS is not an affiliate of al-Qaeda and thus the 2001 AUMF does not apply).
36. See generally U.N. Charter.
37. See Steven R. Ratner, Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello After September 11, 96 AM. J.
INT’L L. 905, 906 (2002) (laying out the difference between jus ad bellum and jus in bello);
Robert D. Sloane, The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in
Bello in the Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 48 (2009) (explaining the
types of legal justification for war).
38. See Ratner, supra note 37; Sloane, supra note 37.
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Finally, Part III will argue that the United States’ engagement is
appropriately classified as an instance of collective self-defense under
international law. This Part will discuss what new AUMF would be
needed in order to be consistent with United States international law
obligations.
I. US ENGAGEMENT AGAINST ISIS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW
This Part will discuss the relevant international law provisions
applicable to the United States engagement against ISIS. One of the
main sources of international law binding the United States here is the
UN Charter.39 Most pertinently, under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter,
UN member States must refrain from the “threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.”40 Thus, member States cannot use force except in certain
circumstances with permission of the UN Security Council.41
As of December 2014, the United States does not have explicit
authorization from the UN Security Council for military engagement
against ISIS.42 The United States then has two options in order to be
compliant with Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.43 First, it can seek
authorization from the Security Council to use force.44 Second, the
United States can argue that it falls under one of the two exceptions in
the UN Charter which permits use of force without Security Council
authorization.45 These two exceptions are the use of force for
purposes of individual or collective self-defense.46
This Part lays out the paths open to the United States in
justifying its engagement under international law. Part I.A explores
the first option open to the United States, namely, the pursuit of a UN
Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force against ISIS.
Part I.B discusses collective self-defense, the first of the two
39. See generally U.N. Charter.
40. U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
41. Id.
42. See generally Security Council Resolutions in 2014 (showing that as of December
2014, no Security Council Resolution gave explicit resolution for military engagement against
ISIS).
43. See U.N. Charter art. 2(4).
44. See U.N. Charter art. 51.
45. Id.
46. Id. ¶ 1.
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exceptions under Article 51 of the UN Charter that would permit the
United States to use force without UN authorization. Part I.C explores
individual self-defense, the second exception under Article 51 that
would exempt the United States from the requirement to seek
authorization. Part I.D will address pre-emptive self-defense, a notion
rooted in international case law that the United States could argue
justifies its engagement against ISIS. Finally, Part I.E will lay out the
“ongoing conflict” argument, which posits that ISIS is the most recent
development in an ongoing conflict in the Middle East in which the
United States is already involved.
A. United Nations Security Council Resolution
The first path the United States could take to justify its
engagement against ISIS involves seeking an authorization for use of
force from the United Nations by way of a Security Council
Resolution.47 Chapter VII of the UN Charter governs state action with
respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of
aggression.48 Under Chapter VII, Article 39, the UN Security Council
must first determine that a threat or breach of the peace has
occurred.49 The UN Security Council has already done this in
Resolution 2178, passed on September 24, 2014.50 The purpose of
Resolution 2178 was to stop home-grown terrorists in member States
from radicalizing and being recruited by ISIS.51 In this resolution, the
Security Council declares ISIS a terrorist group and notes that
terrorism is, “one of the most serious threats to international peace.”52
Thus, the first element for legal authorization is met since ISIS is
described as a threat to the peace. Next, the Security Council would
need to authorize the use of force in order to combat ISIS.53
To authorize the use of force, the Security Council typically
employs the language “all necessary means” to signal such
47. See U.N. Charter art. 39; Ashley Deeks, U.S. Airstrikes Against ISIS in Syria?
Possible International Legal Theories, LAWFARE BLOG (Aug. 23, 2014, 3:04 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2014/08/u-s-airstrikes-against-isis-in-syria-possible-international
-legal-theories/ (laying out the possible legal theories the United States could posit to justify
engaging against ISIS).
48. U.N. Charter art. 39.
49. Id.
50. S.C. Res. 2178, ¶ 1 (Sep. 24, 2014).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. U.N. Charter art. 39.
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authorization.54 Resolution 2178, however, does not use this language
and does not deal with engaging against ISIS directly.55 Indeed, this
resolution focuses specifically on stopping the “flow of foreign
terrorist fighters” within member States that radicalize and go on to
work for ISIS.56 The purpose of this resolution is to encourage
countries to exercise control over potential home-grown terrorists
within their countries.57 It does not necessarily authorize the United
States or other member States to use force to “degrade and destroy”
ISIS in Iraq and Syria.58
Since the only existing resolution on ISIS, Resolution 2178, does
not confer authorization for use of force, the United States must
explicitly request authorization from the Security Council.59 However,
some scholars suggest that the Security Council will not authorize
force against ISIS (specifically in Syria) for political reasons.60
Specifically, if the United States sought Security Council
authorization to engage against ISIS, the United States and its allies
would need consensus from the permanent five members of the
Security Council who retain a veto power: China, Russia, the United
States, France, and the United Kingdom.61 Specifically, it is suggested
that Russia or China would oppose the resolution, nullifying the
unanimity among the permanent five Security Council members

54. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 678, ¶ 2 (Nov. 29, 1990) (authorizing the use of “all necessary
means” to combat the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait); see also Rob McLaughlin, An Assessment of
the Authority for Australia to Use Force Under United Nations Security Council Resolutions
Concerning Iraq, 51 NAVAL L. REV. 252, 264 (2005) (discussing the “all necessary means”
language in Gulf War resolutions).
55. S.C. Res. 2178, (Sep. 24, 2014).
56. Id. ¶ 24.
57. Id. ¶ 4.
58. Id..
59. U.N. Charter art. 39.
60. See, e.g., Josh Rogin, White House Has NO International Legal Justification for
Hitting ISIS in Syria, THE DAILY BEAST (Sep. 23, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2014/09/15/white-house-has-no-international-legal-justification-for-hitting-isis-insyria.html (stating that Russia would be “sure to veto” a Security Council Resolution
authorizing force against ISIS); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (suggesting that the option for a
Security Council Resolution was a “dead letter” in 2012 because Russia and China would not
oppose the Syrian regime).
61. See The Security Council, UNITED NATIONS WEBSITE, http://www.un.org/en/sc/
(describing the veto power of the permanent five members of the Security Council); see also
Current Members, UNITED NATIONS WEBSITE, http://www.un.org/en/sc/members/ (listing the
five permanent members of the Security Council).
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required for a resolution.62 Russia or China may veto this request for
authorization for various geopolitical reasons.63 For example, the
United States has stated that its foreign policy includes arming the
Syrian rebels so that they also fight against the regime of Bashar alAssad.64 Since Russia and China have aligned politically with Syria, it
is possible that they would veto any resolution opposing the Syrian
regime.65 For these reasons, a Security Council resolution authorizing
engagement against ISIS explicitly is at a high risk of being vetoed.
The United States then has a few other paths it could pursue to
obtain international legal justification.66 It could argue that it does not
need Security Council Authorization to engage against ISIS because
the engagement qualifies as self-defense.67 There are two kinds of
self-defense recognized under Article 51 of the UN Charter that
would exempt the United States from needing to seek Security
Council authorization for use of force: collective and individual selfdefense.68 The US could also argue that this is an instance of preemptive self-defense, a concept rooted in international case law, but
collective and individual self-defense are the only two exceptions
listed in the UN Charter.69

62. See, e.g., Rogin, supra note 60 and accompanying text; see also Deeks, supra note
47 (suggesting that the option for a Security Council Resolution was a “dead letter” in 2012
because Russia and China would not oppose the Syrian regime).
63. Russia and China frequently align to veto together; for instance, in May 2014, they
aligned to strike down a resolution referring Syria to the International Criminal Court. They
have also vetoed in tandem three other resolutions related to the Middle East and Syria since
2011. Security Council Veto List, DAG HAMMARSKJÖLD LIBRARY, http://research.un.org/en/
docs/sc/quick (last visited Dec. 19, 2014); see, e.g., UN: Russian and Chinese Vetoes of Syria
ICC Resolution ‘Callous’, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/unrussian-chinese-vetoes-syria-icc-resolution-callous-2014-05-22 [hereinafter Russian and
Chinese Vetoes] (quoting Amnesty International’s Middle East and North Africa Programme
Director who referred to the veto as a “callous political move”).
64. Senior Administration Official, supra note 15.
65. Security Council Veto List, supra note 63; see, e.g., Russian and Chinese Vetoes,
supra note 63.
66. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51 (stating the exceptions under which a State could use
force without Security Council authorization).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., U.N. Charter art. 51. See generally James A. Green, Docking the Caroline:
Understanding the Relevance of the Formula in Contemporary Customary International Law
Concerning Self-Defense, 14 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 429, 435 (2006); Abraham
Sofaer, On the Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 209, 210 n.2 (2003).
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B. Collective Self-Defense
The alternative to gaining Security Council authorization is to
demonstrate that the use of force against ISIS falls within one of the
two self-defense exceptions recognized under Article 51 of the UN
Charter, collective or individual self-defense.70 A situation of
collective security is one where the “protection of the rights of the
states, the reaction against the violation of the law, assumes the
character of a collective enforcement action.”71 There are two ways of
framing the collective self-defense argument. The first envisions
collective self-defense as a situation where one country could ask for
assistance in its own self-defense.72 An example of this type of
collective self-defense lies in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (“NATO”) Treaty, which states that members of the
collective will fight in response to an armed attack against any
member.73 This understanding of collective self-defense has one
important limitation, namely, that it would geographically limit the
United States’ engagement against ISIS to Iraqi territory since Syria
has not consented to assistance from the United States and its NATO
allies.74 Furthermore, this approach would be contingent on Iraqi
consent to the international community’s assistance.75 Iraq could
withdraw this consent and easily invalidate this collective self-defense
argument.76 The second framing for a collective self-defense
argument is that an attack on one country is an attack on all members
of the collective.77 This is the typical understanding of collective selfdefense and the one NATO uses in its charter, the North Atlantic
70. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (stating the exceptions under which a State could use force
without Security Council authorization).
71. Hans Kelsen, Collective Security and Collective Self-Defense Under the Charter of
the United Nations, 42 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 783, 783 (1948) (defining collective security); see
also Deeks, supra note 47 (suggesting that Iraq’s request for assistance from other states could
constitute self-defense).
72. Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining that Iraqi consent is necessary for collective selfdefense).
73. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243.
74. Deeks, supra note 47.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See e.g., Robert J. Delahunty, Paper Charter: Self-Defense and the Failure of the
United Nations Collective Security System, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 871, 887 (2007) (discussing
the typical understanding of collective self-defense); Eustace Chikere Azubuike, Probing the
Scope of Self-defense in International Law, 17 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 129, 158 (2011)
(stating that NATO encouraged all member States to invoke collective self-defense in response
to 9/11).
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Treaty.78 The key distinction between the first and second framings of
collective self-defense is that the first explicitly requires the consent
of the country suffering the attack.79 It is unclear whether the second
requires the consent of the attacked country.80 The importance of this
distinction will be discussed in Section III.
C. Individual Self-Defense
Another exception to the authorization of the use of force also
lies in the UN Charter Article 51 and requires that the United States
demonstrate that engaging against ISIS is necessary for its individual
self-defense.81 There are a number of legal constraints to invoking
either individual or collective self-defense.82 As stated in Article 51, a
State can invoke self-defense only in the event of an “armed attack.”83
Even where an armed attack takes place, the engagement must only
go on “until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security.”84 As such, the threshold
question is whether the activities of ISIS amount to an “armed attack”
against the United States.85
There are two potential readings of Article 51: a strict textualist
reading and a broader purposivist reading.86 This Comment discusses
both interpretations of Article 51 in turn and explores any arguments
the United States could make under each interpretation. Under the
strict textualist reading, a State would need an armed attack before it
78. North Atlantic Treaty, supra note 73, art. 5.
79. Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining that Iraqi consent is necessary for collective selfdefense).
80. See e.g., Delahunty, supra note 77, at 887 (discussing the typical understanding of
collective self-defense without mention of consent on behalf of the attacked state); Chikere
Azubuike, supra note 77, at 158 (stating that NATO invoked collective self-defense before the
U.N. Security Council after 9/11 and encouraged collective self-defense on behalf of all
member states).
81. U.N. Charter art. 51.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.; see e.g., Sean D. Murphy, Terrorism and the Concept of “Armed Attack” in
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 41, 45 (2002) (analyzing the definition of
an “armed attack”).
86. See Stuart G. Baker, Comparing the 1993 U.S. Airstrike on Iraq to the 1986 Bombing
of Libya: The New Interpretation of Article 51, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 99, 109 (1994)
(discussing the two ways of interpreting Article 51); see also Thomas K. Plofchan, Jr., Article
51: Limits on Self-Defense?, 13 MICH. J. INT’L L. 336, 340 (1992) (outlining the debate on the
two interpretations of Article 51).
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could respond in self-defense.87 Article 51 seems to indicate that a
State must wait to be attacked in order to exercise its right to selfdefense.88 This textualist interpretation of Article 51 and the question
of whether its requirement is so strict are subject to some
controversy.89 Under this reading, it may be too late to exercise a right
of self-defense if a State has to wait to be attacked.90 This strict
reading could erode at the concept of a right to self-defense because it
could require States to wait until a point where they can no longer
defend themselves.91 Alternatively, the purposivist approach
encourages a broader understanding of Article 51.92 Under this
reading, Article 51 was designed to preserve the State’s right to selfdefense and, thus, if excessive waiting would jeopardize a State’s
ability to defend itself, Article 51 should be read to allow a carve-out
for self-defense before a State suffers an armed attack.93
Whether or not a State is entitled to self-defense also turns on
how the term “armed attack” is defined.94 Under a strict
understanding of Article 51, the United States could argue that the
brutal murders of James Foley, Steven Sotloff, and other US
87. See Murphy, supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Miriam Sapiro, Iraq:
The Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 599, 604 (2003) (discussing
changing notions of self-defense and the interpretation of Article 51).
88. See Murphy, supra note 85 and accompanying text; see also Sapiro, supra note 87
and accompanying text.
89. Murphy, supra note 85 and accompanying text; Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of
Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT’L L.
576, 584 (2003) (discussing the implications of reading Article 51 for justifying pre-emptive
self-defense).
90. See Murphy, supra note 85 (arguing for a reading of Article 51 that preserves a right
to self-defense before territorial attack); see also Sapiro, supra note 87 and accompanying text.
91. See Murphy, supra note 85 (arguing for a reading of Article 51 that preserves a right
to self-defense before territorial attack); see also Sapiro, supra note 87, at 604 (discussing
changing notion of self-defense and the interpretation of Article 51); Michael J. Glennon, The
Fog of Law: Self-Defense, Inherence, and Incoherence in Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 539, 547 (2002) (discussing narrow constructions of
“armed attack” under Article 51).
92. See Murphy, supra note 85 (arguing for a reading of Article 51 that preserves a right
to self-defense before territorial attack); see also Sapiro, supra note 87 (discussing changing
notion of self-defense and the interpretation of Article 51).
93. See Carsten Stahn, Terrorist Acts as “Armed Attack”: The Right to Self-Defense,
Article 51(1/2) of the UN Charter, and International Terrorism, 27 FALL FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 35, 38 (2003) (discussing the risks and benefits of a broad interpretation of Article 51);
Murphy, supra note 85 (arguing for a reading of Article 51 that preserves a right to selfdefense before territorial attack).
94. See Stahn, supra note 93 and accompanying text; see Murphy, supra note 85
(arguing for a reading of Article 51 that preserves a right to self-defense before territorial
attack).
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journalists meet the definition of an “armed attack” against the United
States as required by Article 51.95 The case governing the definition
of an armed attack is Nicaragua v. United States, brought before the
International Court of Justice (“I.C.J.”).96 Nicaragua states that an
armed attack does not only consist of an action by regular armed
forces but could also include the sending of violent bands or groups
which use force with enough gravity to constitute an armed attack.97
While there has not yet been a territorial attack against the United
States by ISIS forces, the killing of American journalists may suffice
to meet the definition of “armed attack” as it is interpreted by
Nicaragua.98 However, if a narrower definition of “armed attack” is
used, the United States may not meet the definition of “armed attack”
for purposes of Article 51 and may not claim individual selfdefense.99
If the United States does not meet the definition for having
suffered an “armed attack” under Article 51, it may be able to justify
engaging against ISIS under the international law theory of preemptive self-defense.100 Pre-emptive self-defense is a concept rooted

95. U.N. Charter, art. 51; see also Amir Abdallah, Urgent Video: Peter Kassig Beheaded
by ISIS with 16 Syrians, IRAQI NEWS (Nov. 16, 2014), http://www.iraqinews.com/features/
urgent-video-peter-kassig-beheaded-isis-16-syrians/ (showing the beheading of Peter Kassig
by ISIS); Chelsea Carter & Ashley Fantz, ISIS Video Shows Beheading of American Journalist
Steven Sotloff, CNN (Sep. 9, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/02/world/meast/isisamerican-journalist-sotloff/ (discussing the brutality of ISIS violence against American
journalist Steven Sotloff). The murders of journalists like Sotloff were conducted overseas and
thus may not qualify as an armed attack if the “attack” in question must be a territorial attack
upon the continental United States.
96. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (defining an armed attack).
97. Id. (defining an armed attack as including “the sending by or on behalf of a State of
armed bands, groups, irregulars, or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against
another State of such gravity as to amount to” an armed attack).
98. See Baker, supra note 86 and accompanying text; Plofchan, Jr., supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
99. See e.g., Glennon, supra note 91, at 546 (discussing narrow constructions of “armed
attack” under Article 51); see also Stahn, supra note 93 and accompanying text.
100. Green, supra note 69, at 435 (providing the history and origins of pre-emptive selfdefense and describing the Caroline case in international law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226
(arguing for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense).
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in international case law.101 It is entirely separate from Article 51 and
the concept even pre-dates the United Nations by nearly a century.102
D. Pre-emptive Self-Defense
The doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense is credited to former
American Secretary of State, Daniel Webster, who articulated it in
1842 after the infamous Caroline Incident.103 In 1837, the British
destroyed a US ship called the Caroline because they believed it was
being used to support Canadian forces in a rebellion against the
crown.104 Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, corresponded with
British Foreign Minister Lord Ashburton in letters that would later be
credited as recognizing the doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense.105
Under Webster’s understanding of self-defense, a State can preemptively defend itself if there is a need that is “instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for
deliberation.”106 Webster also added a “proportionality” requirement
and crystalized this notion of pre-emptive self-defense into what is
now known as the “Caroline Test.”107
This proportionality element requires that a State only do what is
absolutely necessary in its self-defense, and nothing more
excessive.108 The Caroline Test was recognized by the Nuremberg
101. Green, supra note 69 (discussing the Caroline case and analyzing pre-emptive selfdefense in international case law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing for the validity of the
concept of pre-emptive self-defense).
102. Green, supra note 69 (exploring the Caroline doctrine and its historical roots);
Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense).
103. Green, supra note 69 (providing the history and origins of pre-emptive self-defense
and describing the Caroline case in international law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing
for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense).
104. Green, supra note 69 (providing the history and origins of pre-emptive self-defense
and describing the Caroline case in international law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing
for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense).
105. Green, supra note 69 (providing the history and origins of pre-emptive self-defense
and describing the Caroline case in international law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing
for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense).
106. Green, supra note 69 (providing the history and origins of pre-emptive self-defense
and describing the Caroline case in international law); Sofaer, supra note 69, at 226 (arguing
for the concept of pre-emptive self-defense).
107. James Denver & John Denver, Making Waves: Refitting the Caroline Doctrine for
the Twenty-First Century, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 165 (2013) (explaining the basic tenets of
the Caroline Test); Timothy Kearley, Raising the Caroline, 17 WIS. INT’L L.J. 325, 331 (1999)
(outlining the history of the Caroline Test).
108. Denver, supra note 107 (explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline Test); Kearley,
supra note 107 (outlining the history of the Caroline Test).
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Tribunal when it judged Germany’s invasion of Norway in World
War II.109 It has been applied most recently to the US policy regarding
cyber attacks as well as US responses to terrorism in the Middle
East.110 Unlike the theory of self-defense under Article 51 of the UN
Charter, pre-emptive self-defense does not require the same kind of
immediacy.111 Pre-emptive self-defense allows for responses to
imminent threats before they materialize into immediate attacks.112
In order to engage against ISIS under pre-emptive self-defense,
the United States would need to demonstrate necessity and
proportionality, the requirements of the Caroline test stated above.113
The United States could argue that engagement is necessary since
ISIS has directly targeted and killed American journalists in order to
send a message to the United States, threatening further violence.114
The growing wealth and territorial expansion of ISIS has led the
United States to view it as a credible national security threat.115 In a
letter to Congress on August 17, 2014, President Obama also pointed
to dangers posed to “US personnel and facilities, including the US

109. Jack M. Beard, America’s New War on Terror: The Case for Self-Defense Under
International Law, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 559, 585 n.91 (2002) (stating that the
Caroline Test was applied by the Nuremburg Tribunal); Green, supra note 69, at 447
(discussing the application of the Caroline Test in the Nuremberg Tribunal).
110. John Denver & James Denver, Cyberwarfare: Attribution, Preemption, and
National Self-defense, 2 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 25, 37 (2013) (applying the Caroline Test to
cybersecurity); see also Denver, supra note 107; Thomas R. Anderson, Legitimizing the New
Imminence: Bridging the Gap Between the Just War and the Bush Doctrine, 8 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 261, 265 (2010) (discussing the Caroline Test in the modern context).
111. See Denver, supra note 107, at 193; Kearley, supra note 107, at 331 (outlining the
history of the Caroline Test).
112. See e.g., Denver, supra note 107; see also Anderson, supra note 107, at 265
(discussing the Caroline Test in the modern context).
113. Denver, supra note 107 (explaining the basic tenants of the Caroline Test); Kearley,
supra note 107, at 331.
114. See e.g., Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing ISIS’s targeting of Americans like Peter
Kassig); see also Carter & Fantz, supra note 95 (showing the beheading of an American
journalist by ISIS). See generally, Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining that the necessity
argument would be rooted in preventing further violence by ISIS).
115. Letter from Barack Obama, President of the United States, to the Speaker of the
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, (Aug. 17, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/08/17/letter-president-war-powersresolution-regarding-iraq (stating that actions against ISIS are in the interest of national
security); see also Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (detailing the plan to combat
ISIS and prevent further violence).
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Embassy in Baghdad.”116 More broadly, if ISIS were to establish
enough power to dominate the region and (in the worst of cases)
acquire more destructive weapons, the United States may be a
primary target.117 ISIS’s attacks on American journalists and its
continuing threats to increase violence against the United States may
provide sufficient basis to find a need for self-defense.118 Evidence of
credible threats by ISIS against the United States strengthens the
necessity argument for pre-emptive self-defense.119
The necessity element is met if the need for defensive action is
imminent, “instant” and “overwhelming” under the Caroline Test.120
The defensive action must occur in the last possible window of time
before an almost certain attack.121 Under this prong of the Caroline
test, the United States could argue that ISIS had already taken over
Mosul and was poised to gain further territory in Iraq.122 Moreover,
116. Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 115 (stating that ISIS poses a threat to US
personnel and facilities); see also Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (detailing the
plan to combat ISIS and prevent further violence).
117. See, e.g., Carter & Fantz, supra note 114 (showing ISIS’s targeting of United States
journalist); see Abdallah, supra note 114 (showing attacks by ISIS that deliberately target
United States citizens).
118. See Thomas R. Anderson, Legitimizing the New Imminence: Bridging the Gap
Between the Just War and the Bush Doctrine, 8 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 261, 265 (2010)
(discussing the Caroline test for pre-emptive self-defense); Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining
possible United States arguments for why combating ISIS is necessary); see also, Denver,
supra note 107, at 173-74 (explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline Test).
119. Deeks, supra note 47 (arguing that “the more specific, serious, and tangible those
threats, the stronger the case for anticipatory air strikes”); see Denver, supra note 107
(explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline Test, which determines the validity of a selfdefense argument); Anderson, supra note 118 (discussing the Caroline test for pre-emptive
self-defense).
120. See James A. Green, Docking the Caroline: Understanding the Relevance of the
Formula in Contemporary Customary International Law Concerning Self-Defense, 14
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 429, 435 (2006) (explaining pre-emptive self-defense and
describing the Caroline case in international law); see also, Abraham D. Sofaer, On the
Necessity of Pre-emption, 14 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 209 (2003) (arguing for the concept of preemptive self-defense).
121. Michael N. Schmitt, U.S. Security Strategies: A Legal Assessment, 27 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POLY. 737, 755-56 (2004) (stating that the inquiry is “whether the defensive action
occurred during the last possible window of opportunity in the face of an attack that was
almost certainly going to occur.”). See generally Green, supra note 120 (explaining preemptive self-defense and describing the Caroline case in international law).
122. See, e.g., Sarah Almukhtar & Jeremy Ashkenas et al., The Front Line Between ISIS
and Iraqi Forces in Tikrit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2014/06/12/world/middleeast/the-iraq-isis-conflict-in-maps-photos-and-video.html (showing
through informational graphics the territory gained by ISIS); see also Barbara Starr & Susanna
Capelouto, Plan to Retake Mosul from ISIS Emerges, CNN, Nov. 29, 2014, http://www.
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the aforementioned attacks against American journalists had already
been carried out.123 The United States would have needed to argue
that waiting any longer to respond to ISIS would have resulted in
further deaths and territorial acquisition, which threatens United
States personnel or global peace.124
International case law suggests that the United States would
need to exhaust all peaceful remedies before pre-emptive self-defense
is warranted.125 For instance, the UN Security Council rejected a preemptive self-defense made by Israel when it failed to exhaust all
peaceful remedies first.126 In 1981, Israel had destroyed a nuclear
reactor near Baghdad, arguing that Iraq was building a weapon to use
against Israel.127 The United Nations rejected Israel’s pre-emptive
self-defense argument on the grounds that Israel had not exhausted all
peaceful means before resorting to force.128 Former State Department
Legal Advisor William H. Taft highlighted in a memorandum that the
UN Security Council unanimously condemned the attack, despite
Israel’s preemptive self-defense argument.129 UN member States
pointed to the fact that the Iraqi reactor was in full compliance with

cnn.com/2014/11/28/world/meast/mosul-attack-plan/ (stating the United States response to
ISIS overtaking Mosul).
123. See Abdallah, supra note 114 (showing attacks by ISIS that deliberately target
United States citizens); see, e.g., Carter & Fantz, supra note 114 (showing ISIS’s targeting of
United States journalist).
124. See Green, supra note 120 (explaining pre-emptive self-defense and describing the
Caroline case in international law); see also Sofaer, supra note 120.
125. See Memorandum from William H. Taft, Legal Adviser, Dep’t of State, to
Members of the ASIL-CFR Roundtable (Nov. 18 2001), http://www.cfr.org/internationallaw/legal-basis-preemption/p5250 (discussing the legal basis for preemption and explaining
the Israel case). See generally, S.C. Res. 487, (June 19, 1981) (detailing the United Nations’
condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of peaceful remedy
the United States has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation).
126. See Memorandum from William H. Taft, supra note 125; see, e.g., S.C. Res. 2178
(Sep. 24, 2014) (detailing the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an
example of one kind of peaceful remedy the United States has sought, namely, a Security
Council condemnation).
127. See Memorandum from William H. Taft, supra note 125.
128. See id.. See generally S.C. Res. 487, supra note 125 (detailing the UN’s
condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of peaceful remedy
the United States has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation).
129. See Memorandum from William H. Taft, supra note 125; see also S.C. Res. 487,
supra note 125 (detailing the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an
example of one kind of peaceful remedy the United States has sought, namely, Security
Council condemnation).
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treaty obligations and that the threat to Israel was too tenuous.130
Thus, Israel’s destruction of the plant was considered neither
proportional nor necessary, as is required for a preemptive selfdefense argument.131
Israel’s case differs from the United States’ engagement against
ISIS in a number of ways.132 First, the United States has already
exhausted several peaceful remedies.133 It formed an international
coalition and sought a Security Council resolution condemning ISIS
(though not authorizing force).134 Second, ISIS is a non-state actor
and a terrorist organization without a diplomatic body, eliminating
diplomacy as a possible resource. 135
In the Israeli case, by contrast, Israel was exerting force against a
sovereign state, namely, Iraq.136 In this case, the United States and the
international coalition have received permission from Iraq to assist in
the retaliation against ISIS.137 While Israel may have had a legitimate
130. See Memorandum from William H. Taft, supra note 125; see also S.C. Res. 487,
supra note 125 (detailing the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an
example of one kind of peaceful remedy the United States has sought, namely, Security
Council condemnation).
131. See Taft Memorandum, supra note 125, (discussing the legal basis for preemption
and explaining the Israel case); see also S.C. Res. 487, supra note 125 (detailing the UN’s
condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of peaceful remedy
the United States has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation).
132. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that the Security Council
rejected the Israeli argument because Israel had not exhausted peaceful means), with S.C. Res.
2178, (Sep. 24, 2014) [hereinafter S.C. Res. 2178] (expressing the UN’s condemnation of
violent extremism).
133. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that the Security Council
rejected the Israeli argument because it did not exhaust peaceful means), with S.C. Res. 2178,
supra note 132, (detailing the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an
example of one kind of peaceful remedy the United States has sought, namely, a Security
Council condemnation).
134. Background Conference Call on the President’s Address to the Nation (Sep. 10,
2014), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/10/background-conference-callpresidents-address-nation [hereinafter Background Conference Call] (stating the United States’
establishment of an international coalition); see also S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 132 (detailing
the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of
peaceful remedy the United States has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation).
135. See S.C. Res. 2170 (calling ISIS a “terrorist organization”); Background Conference
Call, supra note 134 (calling ISIS a “terrorist organization” that will require “different tools”
in response).
136. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that Israel’s military action
was against Iraq), with S.C. Res. 487, supra note 125 (condemning Israel’s military action).
137. Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining that Iraq has given consent for engagement
against ISIS which it “could withdraw”); Missy Ryan, U.S. urges Iraq to ensure coalition aid
is effective against Islamic State, THE WASHINGTON POST, Mar. 9, 2015, http://www.
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State interest in pre-empting an Iraqi attack, the United Nations is
founded on principles of deference toward State sovereignty and thus
Israel had an uphill battle in justifying its use of force against a
state.138 The United States, by contrast, would be engaging against a
terrorist non-state actor, condemned by the very country it has taken
as its host.139
The Israeli case also differs from the US engagement against
ISIS because the threat against Israel was more remote, according to
the United Nations. The Iraqi reactor had not yet been put to any use
against Israel according to the United Nations.140 The remoteness of
the threat made the pre-emptive self-defense argument too weak to
withstand Security Council scrutiny.141 ISIS has been waging a
violent campaign for months and this may be sufficient to withstand
Security Council scrutiny as to the proximity of the threat.142
In addition to showing the imminence of the threat, the United
States must show that the use of force is proportional under the
Caroline test.143 The seminal case explaining proportionality is the
Nicaragua case discussed above.144 In the Nicaragua case, the court
washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/us-urges-iraq-to-ensure-coalition-aid-is-effectiveagainst-islamic-state/2015/03/09/8ef90302-c67a-11e4-b2a1-bed1aaea2816_story.html
(quoting Iraqi Defense Minister Khaled al-Obeidi as saying that Iraq has “asked for help from
many countries that [it] has a strategic relationship with, and that includes the United States”).
138. See U.N. Charter art. 59 (articulating the prohibition on use of force); see also U.N.
Charter art. 2 (laying out the foundational principles of sovereignty).
139. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that Israel’s military action
was against Iraq), with S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 132 (detailing the UN’s condemnation of
violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of peaceful remedy the United States
has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation).
140. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that Iraqi reactor had not been
put to use against Israel), with S.C. Res. 487, supra note 125 (condemning Israeli response to
Iraqi reactors).
141. Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that Israel’s pre-emptive self-defense
argument was rejected); S.C. Res. 487, supra note 125 (condemning Israeli response to Iraqi
reactors).
142. Compare Taft Memorandum, supra note 125 (stating that Israel’s pre-emptive selfdefense argument was rejected), with S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 132 (detailing the UN’s
condemnation of violent extremism and serving as an example of one kind of peaceful remedy
the United States has sought, namely, Security Council condemnation).
143. Denver, supra note 107 (explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline Test); Kearley,
supra note 107, at 331 (outlining the history of the Caroline Test).
144. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) (evaluating the proportionality of a United States military
action); see also Armed Activities On the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v.
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. 116 (Dec. 19) (reinforcing the Nicaragua standard for
proportionality).
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relied heavily on whether there was an armed attack in order to
discern whether the response of the United States was proportional.145
The Nicaragua interpretation of proportionality involves the
assessment of whether the counter-attack is proportionate to the attack
itself and to the needs of self-defense.146 Thus, the United States’
argument for proportionality may hinge on whether ISIS is found to
have conducted an “armed attack” against the United States and
whether that attack warrants the United States tripartite response
measures: air strikes, arming Syrian rebels, and the creation of an
international coalition.147
One challenge the United States may face in relying on the preemptive self-defense argument is that the United States would be
geographically confined to fighting ISIS only in Iraq because its
engagement in Syria may not be supported by the Nicaragua
ruling.148 In Nicaragua, the United States provided arms, financial
assistance, and training to the Contras, the Nicaraguan opposition
forces.149 This is factually similar to what the United States would be
doing in Syria, namely, arming Syrian rebels so that they oppose the
Syrian regime and fight ISIS.150 In Nicaragua, the I.C.J. held that the
United States’ self-defense argument for arming the Nicaraguan
145. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (evaluating the proportionality of a United States military
action); see also Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. (reinforcing the Nicaragua standard
for proportionality).
146. Thomas M. Franck, On Proportionality of Countermeasures in International Law,
102 AM. J. INT’L L. 715, 767 (2008) (arguing that proportionality depends on self-defense
needs); see also Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. (Dec. 19) (reinforcing the Nicaragua
standard for proportionality).
147. See Franck, supra note 146, at 767 (arguing that proportionality depends on the
self-defense needs); see also Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda, 2005 I.C.J. (reinforcing the
Nicaragua standard for proportionality).
148. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan
to arm Syrian rebels) and Senior Administration Official, Background Conference Call on the
President’s Address to the Nation (Sep. 10, 2014) http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/09/10/background-conference-call-presidents-address-nation
(describing
the
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).
149. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Josh Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States
plan to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).
150. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan
to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).
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rebels could not be sustained.151 If the United States wants to engage
against ISIS by arming the Syrian rebels they would need to argue
that it is a justified pre-emptive self-defense measure distinguishable
from the one in Nicaragua.152
There are several ways this argument can be made. First, there
are historical differences that may make the United States’ argument
against ISIS stronger than the one struck down in Nicaragua.153 In
Nicaragua, the United States supported Nicaraguan rebels so as to
overthrow the existing political leader.154 Unlike Nicaragua, the
United States’ engagement against ISIS is motivated by national
security concerns and a desire to deter international terrorism.155
Moreover, in the Nicaragua case, the I.C.J. ruled against the United
States because the United States did not declare itself to be attacked,
as required for an argument of individual self-defense.156 The
argument that the United States was acting in self-defense held no
water, according to the I.C.J.157 If the United States were to use the
theory of pre-emptive self-defense to engage ISIS by arming Syrian
rebels, there would be no need to declare the United States
attacked.158 This is because the purpose of a pre-emptive strike would
be to prevent the attack in question.159 Third, the fact that ISIS is a
non-state actor and Nicaragua is a State makes the instant situation
151. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (rejecting the United States’ self-defense claim).
152. Id.
153. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 15 (describing the United States plan
to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 16 (describing the
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).
154. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan
to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).
155. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan
to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).
156. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (ruling against the United States’ self-defense argument
since they did not declare themselves attacked).
157. Id.
158. Taft, supra note 125 (explaining pre-emptive self-defense). Compare Nicar. v. U.S.,
1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the Nicaraguan opposition forces), with
Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior
Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the United States plan to arm Syrian
rebels).
159. Taft, supra note 125; Deeks, supra note 47 (laying out a pre-emptive self-defense
argument the United States could make).
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dissimilar to that of Nicaragua.160 Nicaragua’s statehood makes
diplomacy a possible option, which is not the case in dealing with
terrorist organizations like ISIS.161 These distinguishing factors may
show that arming Syrian rebels would be a justifiable pre-emptive
self-defense measure that would pass scrutiny under international
law.162
E. Ongoing Conflict
The final possible legal justification under international law is
one that frames the hostility with ISIS as the most recent development
in an “ongoing conflict” against al-Qaeda in the Middle East.163 The
implications of this are twofold.164 First, if the United States’
engagement against ISIS is part of an ongoing conflict with al-Qaeda,
the United States may not need renewed Security Council
authorization for an armed conflict that has been going on since
2001.165 Secondly, framing the engagement against ISIS as part of an
“ongoing conflict” would mean that President Obama might not need
additional justification under United States law to combat ISIS apart
from the existing 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force.166
160. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. (describing the United States’ arming of the
Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States plan
to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).
161. See Taft, supra note 124 (discussing the legal basis for preemption); see also Nicar.
v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 14 (June 27).
162. Compare Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 14 (describing the United States’ arming of
the Nicaraguan opposition forces), with Earnest, supra note 16 (describing the United States
plan to arm Syrian rebels), and Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the
United States plan to arm Syrian rebels).
163. Deeks, supra note 47 (laying out the “ongoing conflict” argument briefly). See
generally Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (describing the United States plan to
combat ISIS).
164. See Brett LoGiurato and Hunter Walker, Congressman: Obama’s Expansion of His
INSIDER,
Sep.
24,
2014,
ISIS
Campaign
is
‘Illegal’,
BUSINESS
http://www.businessinsider.com/obama-isis-legal-aumf-congress-2014-9
(evaluating
Administration officials’ claim that “ISIS falls under the 2001 AUMF because of its previous
affiliation with al-Qaeda.”); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining the international law
implications of the “ongoing conflict” argument).
165. Deeks, supra note 47 (stating that using the “ongoing conflict” argument as an
international legal theory would force the United States to “confront the sovereignty/territorial
issues involved in using force against ISIS in a foreign state”). See generally U.N. Charter art.
2 ¶ 4 (making no mention of protocol for requests to use force for a new hostility in an
ongoing conflict).
166. See Senior Administration Official, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as the
source of authority under United States law for the President’s engagement against ISIS). But
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Accordingly, the “ongoing conflict” argument would affect both the
international law justifications and the US law justifications for
engaging against ISIS.167
There are a number of challenges associated with United States
reliance on the “ongoing conflict” argument. First, the idea that ISIS
is the latest chapter in an ongoing conflict with al-Qaeda is factually
dependent on whether or not ISIS is actually related to al-Qaeda in
some way.168 Whether or not ISIS is sufficiently affiliated with alQaeda to qualify as being part of an “ongoing conflict” is subject to
some debate.169 Another challenge associated with this argument is
that it leaves unclear the United States’ obligations to the Security
Council.170 Under the UN Charter, it is unclear whether the United
States would still be obligated to seek a Security Council resolution
for its use of force against ISIS, even if it is part of an ongoing
conflict.171
As of the time of publication of this Comment, the United
States’ obligations before the Security Council remain in limbo if the
United States uses the “ongoing conflict” argument.172 Though the
United States does not yet have Security Council authorization, the
cf., LoGiurato, supra note 164 (evaluating Administration officials’ claim that “ISIS falls
under the 2001 AUMF because of its previous affiliation with al-Qaeda.”).
167. See LoGiurato, supra note 164 (evaluating Administration officials’ claim that
“ISIS falls under the 2001 AUMF because of its previous affiliation with al-Qaeda.”); see also
Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining the international law implications of the “ongoing conflict”
argument).
168. See LoGiurato, supra note 164 (discussing the claim of whether ISIS is sufficiently
affiliated with al-Qaeda); see also Deeks, supra note 47 ( proposing legal arguments under
domestic law and exploring the international law implications of the “ongoing conflict”
argument).
169. See e.g., LoGiurato, supra note 164 (explaining the effect of ISIS’ affiliation with
al-Qaeda on the “ongoing conflict” argument); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining the
international law implications of the “ongoing conflict” argument).
170. See generally U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 4 (making no mention of protocol for requests
to use force for a new hostility in an ongoing conflict). See also U.N. Charter art. 51 (making
no mention of an exception to the prohibition on use of force for new developments in ongoing
conflicts).
171. See generally U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 4 (setting forth international obligations for laws
of war, but omitting discussion of when countries may use force for a new hostility in an
ongoing conflict). See also U.N. Charter art. 51 (describing exceptions to the prohibition
against use of force but making no mention of an exception for new developments in ongoing
conflicts).
172. See generally U.N. Charter art. 2 ¶ 4 (making no mention of protocol for requests to
use force for a new hostility in an ongoing conflict). See also U.N. Charter art. 51 (making no
mention of an exception to the prohibition on use of force for new developments in ongoing
conflicts).
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engagement against ISIS has already begun.173 This leaves questions
open about what role a Security Council resolution would play in this
specific scenario.174 As mentioned above, it could be reduced to a
diplomatic veneer, rather than a hard source of legal authority.175
Additionally, it could leave questions open about what transnational
action would be authorized with and without a Security Council
resolution.176 While the United Nations has not given authorization
for use of military force against ISIS, Resolution 2178 does seem to
internalize the “ongoing conflict” argument and extend it to
engagement in the Levant in several ways.177 The resolution refers to
the relevant entities as “the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant
(‘ISIL’), the Al-Nusrah Front (‘ANF’) and other cells, affiliates,
splinter groups or derivatives of Al-Qaida.”178 Notably, the resolution
seems to imply some connection between ISIS and Al-Qaeda, a
principle which fundamentally underpins the “ongoing conflict”
argument.179 Additionally, by referring to it as ISIL, the resolution
imbues the group with a transnational quality extending to the Levant,
which includes Syria.180 This means that the authority granted in the
resolution extends to all engagement within the Levant including
Syria.181 This is one material way in which the “ongoing conflict”
argument differs from the other arguments, discussed above, that the
executive branch could make. Nevertheless, the “ongoing conflict”
argument, and ultimately the United States’ strategy for developing an

173. See Josh Rogin, White House Has No International Legal Justification for Hitting
ISIS in Syria, THE DAILY BEAST, Sep. 23, 2014, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/
09/15/white-house-has-no-international-legal-justification-for-hitting-isis-in-syria.html
(pointing out the lack of United States international law justifications); see also Deeks, supra
note 47 (explaining the international law implications of the “ongoing conflict” argument).
174. See Rogin, supra note 173 (pointing out the lack of United States international law
justifications); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining the international law implications of
the “ongoing conflict” argument).
175. See Rogin, supra note 173 (stating that the United States provided no international
law justifications); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (laying out the implications of using the
“ongoing conflict” argument).
176. See Rogin, supra note 173 (arguing that the United States should have provided an
international law justification for engaging ISIS); see also Deeks, supra note 47 (explaining
the international law implications of the “ongoing conflict” argument as well as other
pathways for international justification).
177. S.C. Res. 2178, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2178 (Sept. 24, 2014).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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international law justification would depend on whether the US
Congress passes a new ISIS AUMF.182
No matter what legal justification the United States chooses, its
legal basis under US law for engaging against ISIS must be consistent
with the United States’ obligations under international law.183 The US
Congress would ultimately need to pass an AUMF consistent with the
provisions of international law to which the United States is bound.184
The following section will discuss the justifications under US law that
the President could use to engage against ISIS and their implications
for the United States’ international commitments.185
II. JUSTIFICATIONS UNDER UNITED STATES LAW FOR
ENGAGEMENT AGAINST ISIS
This Part will deal with the potential legal theories under US law
that would justify the President’s engagement against ISIS. It will
also examine how potential AUMFs would interact with international
law. The key issue is whether a new AUMF would be consistent with
the United States’ arguments under international law.
In order to establish justification under US law, the White House
had two choices.186 First, the President could seek Congressional
authorization for military engagement.187 Second, he could proceed
under the argument that involvement was authorized under the
President’s executive powers, as granted by Article 2 of the United
States Constitution.188 The White House ultimately chose the latter
and argued that the President did not need Congressional
authorization because the operation fell under his Article 2
Presidential powers and because he was granted statutory authority
under the 2001 AUMF.189 The White House’s use of the 2001 AUMF
as a source of legal justification is subject to debate since the 2001
182. See generally infra Part II.
183. See e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (stating the United States’ obligations under the
U.N. charter regarding use of force); see Rogin, supra note 173 (pointing out the lack of
United States international law justifications).
184. See generally infra Part II. See e.g., U.N. Charter art. 2(4) (stating the United
States’ obligations under the U.N. charter regarding use of force).
185. See generally infra Part II.
186. See generally infra Part II.
187. U.S. CONST. art. II.
188. Id.
189. See id.; see also Senior Official, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as
justification for engaging against ISIS).
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AUMF was designed only to grant the President power to respond to
organizations associated with the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.190 Critics argue that ISIS is a distinct group unrelated to the
groups that engineered the September 11 attacks, and thus that the
2001 AUMF alone does not grant the President the necessary
authority to engage ISIS.191
In the Fall of 2014, a number of new AUMFs were proposed by
Congress to supply the President with the requisite US law
justification.192 This section will discuss the use of the 2001 AUMF as
a form of legal justification under US law. It will also explore what a
new AUMF might need to comport with US and international law.
Part II.A discusses the War Powers Resolution (“WPR”) and explores
the sources of authority within the United States government for
engaging against ISIS. Part II.B discusses the role of a sunset
provision in an AUMF, clearly marking the expiration date of the
authority it grants. Part II.C will discuss the geographic bounds of the
engagement against ISIS that a new AUMF might propose. Finally,
Part II.D will discuss how the international law justifications
discussed in Part I would impact a new AUMF.
A. Determining the Source of Authority: The War Powers Resolution
The threshold legal question here relates to the federal balance of
powers: who has the authority to authorize engagement against
ISIS?193 On the one hand, the President can authorize engagement
under his Article 2 Commander-in-Chief powers.194 On the other
hand, Congress has the constitutional power to declare war under
Article 1.195 Congress did not use its power to declare war and the
190. See e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164 (arguing that the AUMF does not suffice as
legal justification); Deeks, supra note 47 (discussing possible critiques to the AUMF as legal
justification).
191. See e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164 (arguing for the insufficiency of the 2001
AUMF as legal justification to engage ISIS); Deeks, supra note 47 (discussing possible
problems with using the 2001 AUMF as legal justification).
192. Matthew C. Weed, Cong. Research Serv., R43760, A New Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against the Islamic State: Comparison of Current Proposals in Brief, (2014)
(laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress); see e.g., H.R.J. Res. 128, 113th Cong. (2014)
(proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS that would incorporate international
law provisions).
193. See U.S. CONST. art. II (granting presidential powers); see also U.S. CONST. art. I
(granting congressional powers).
194. U.S. CONST. art. II.
195. U.S. CONST. art. I.
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President exercised his executive powers to engage against ISIS.196
Since the authorization of engagement against ISIS came from the
President, the WPR is the relevant legislation in determining whether
the President properly exercised his executive powers to engage
ISIS.197
The WPR interprets the President’s Commander-in-Chief
powers as granted by the Constitution.198 It limits Presidential
exercise of military force to the following three situations: “1) a
declaration of war, 2) specific statutory authorization, or 3) a national
emergency created by attack upon the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces.”199 As there has been no declaration
of war against ISIS, the first prong of the WPR would not apply in
this case.200 According to the Obama Administration, the second
prong applies here because the 2001 AUMF grants sufficient statutory
authority for the President to authorize engagement against ISIS.201
The manner in which the US government interprets its
obligations under international law affects its Presidential Powers
argument under the WPR in several ways.202 For instance, if the
United States argues to the United Nations that there has been an
“armed attack” for purposes of Article 51 authorization of force under
international law, the United States may still retain ability to use the
third prong of the WPR.203 The third prong grants justification for
Presidential authorization of force in the case of a national emergency
brought about by an attack on the United States.204 One reason the
United States might not choose this argument is because there was no

196. Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 115 (explaining the President’s engagement
against ISIS); see also U.S. CONST. art. II (granting presidential powers).
197. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006).
198. Id.
199. Id. If none of these prongs apply, the War Powers Resolution’s reporting
requirements are triggered and the President must notify Congress within 48 hours of
committing armed forces to military action. Additionally, the President must forbid armed
forces from remaining for more than 60 days, unless one of the three prongs above applies.
200. Id.
201. Background Conference Call, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as a source of
authority); Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 115 (explaining the President’s engagement
against ISIS).
202. See generally supra Part I.E.
203. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006).
204. Id.
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territorial attack on the United States, its territories or possessions.205
However, the United States might still be interested in making a selfdefense argument before the United Nations.206 This would require a
showing that an “armed attack” occurred against the United States in
the form of the murders of American journalists.207 If the United
States can argue before the international community that an “armed
attack” occurred for purposes of Article 51 of the UN Charter, it
would have to make the same argument to establish justification
under US law using the third prong of the War Powers Act.208
Otherwise, the United States’ international justification would be
inconsistent with its justification under US law.209
If none of the three prongs of the WPR apply, the WPR
reporting requirements and timetable would be triggered.210 This
timetable limits the President’s authority to engage in hostilities to a
maximum of 60 days.211 After these 60 days, the engagement would
lose its legal force.212 If none of these three exceptions under the
WPR are deemed applicable, the timetable would have already
expired as of the publication of this Comment.213 Thus, the President
would be in breach.214 However, the current position of the Obama
Administration is that the President has specific statutory authority
under the 2001 AUMF.215 Accordingly, it is the Obama

205. Cf. Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing the beheading of Peter Kassig by ISIS). See
also Carter & Fantz, supra note 15 (discussing the brutality of ISIS violence against American
journalist Steven Sotloff).
206. See generally supra Part I.
207. See, e.g., Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing the beheading of Peter Kassig by ISIS);
see also Carter & Fantz, supra note 95 (discussing the brutality of ISIS violence against
American journalist Steven Sotloff).
208. War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006); see also U.N. Charter art.
51. The argument that an armed attack occurred for purposes of Article 51 would authorize the
exercise of executive powers without triggering the War Powers Resolution’s reporting
requirements if the presence of ISIS rose to the level of a “national emergency” as required by
this prong.
209. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006); see also U.N. Charter art. 51.
210. 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b)(1) (1973).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. 50 U.S.C. § 1541.
215. Id.
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Administration’s position that no breach could occur because prong
two of the WPR applies.216
The use of the 2001 AUMF as statutory justification has inspired
several critiques.217 One main critique is that the statute is thirteen
years old and, as mentioned above, was intended for al-Qaeda and its
progeny.218 In Secretary of State John Kerry’s testimony before
Congress, he defended the use of the 2001 AUMF as a source of legal
justification.219 Congressman Menendez replied to Kerry’s defense of
the 2001 AUMF as follows:
At least from the chair’s perspective, you’re going to need a new
AUMF. And it will have to be more tailored because I don’t want
to be part of [it] 13 years later and multitude of countries that
have been used in this regard for that to be the authority.220

Congress thus saw the President’s unilateral action against ISIS as an
illegal use of the 2001 AUMF.221 Nevertheless, the Administration
has welcomed the initiation of a new AUMF from Congress that
would be specifically tailored to combating ISIS.222 There are

216. Background Conference Call, supra note 15 (citing the 2001 AUMF as a source of
authority); see also Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 115 (explaining the President’s
engagement against ISIS).
217. See e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164 (arguing that the AUMF does not suffice as
legal justification); Deeks, supra note 47 (discussing possible critiques to the AUMF as legal
justification).
218. See e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164 (discussing the merits of the 2001 AUMF and
concluding that the statute is too outdated to be applied to ISIS); Deeks, supra note 47
(discussing problems with using the 2001 AUMF as justification for engaging against ISIS).
219. Susan Jones, Kerry: Obama Administration Listening to ‘Good Lawyers’ Rather
Than Congress, CNS NEWS (Sept. 18, 2014), http://cnsnews.com/news/article/susan-jones/
kerry-obama-administration-listening-good-lawyers-rather-congress (quoting Congressman
Menendez’s critique of the use of the 2001 AUMF); see e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164
(arguing that the AUMF does not suffice as legal justification); Deeks, supra note 47
(discussing possible critiques to the AUMF as legal justification).
220. Jones, supra note 219 (quoting Congressman Menendez’s critique of the use of the
2001 AUMF); see, e.g., Logiurato, supra note 164 (arguing that the AUMF does not suffice as
legal justification); Deeks, supra note 47 (discussing possible critiques to the AUMF as legal
justification).
221. Jones, supra note 219 (quoting Congressman Menendez’s critique of the use of the
2001 AUMF); see, e.g., LoGiurato, supra note 164 (arguing that the AUMF does not suffice as
legal justification).
222. Letter from Barack Obama, supra note 115 (stating that actions against ISIS are in
the interest of national security); see also Senior Administration Official, supra note 15
(detailing the plan to combat ISIS and prevent further violence).
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currently seven such proposed ISIS AUMFs as of November 2014.223
The following subsections describe some of the principal legal
differences between the proposed AUMFs, specifically with regards
to how they comport with international law.
B. Sunset Provision: The Duration of Authorized Force
One of the main AUMF provisions argued for by scholars is a
sunset provision that would clearly mark when the authorization of
force would expire.224 Indeed, one reason the Obama Administration
was able to rely on the September 2001 AUMF was because it
contained no sunset provision.225 A sunset provision would not
require the withdrawal of military forces before the objectives of the
mission were completed.226 However, it would allow Congress to reconsider at a later date the conditions upon which it would continue to
support the evolving conflict.227 This sunset provision would need to
take into account international law limitations for the timetable of the
engagement.228 These limitations would vary depending on which of
the above international law justifications the United States uses.229
If the United States chooses the individual or collective selfdefense justifications under international law, the following may be

223. Weed, supra note 192 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress); see also H.R.J.
Res. 128, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS that
would incorporate international law provisions).
224. See Jennifer Daskal & Stephen Vladeck, After the AUMF, 5 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J.
115, 142-44 (2014); see also Weed, supra note 192, at 4-5 (laying out AUMFs proposed by
Congress).
225. See Goldsmith, supra note 34 (arguing that the 2001 AUMF is too expansive a
grant of executive power); see also LoGiurato, supra note 164 (arguing that ISIS is not
connected to perpetrators of 9/11 and cannot be fought under the 2001 AUMF).
226. Rosa Brooks et. al., Principles to Guide Congressional Authorization of the
Continued Use of Force Against ISIL, JUST SECURITY (2014), http://justsecurity.org/wpcontent/uploads/2014/11/ISIS-AUMF-Statement-FINAL.pdf (listing principles needed for a
new AUMF); see Daskal, supra note 224, at 142 (discussing the legal needs with regards to a
new AUMF).
227. Brooks et. al., supra note 226 (discussing guiding principals for the drafting of a
new AUMF); see Daskal, supra note 224, at 142 (discussing the legal needs with regards to a
new AUMF).
228. Brooks et. al., supra note 226 (listing principles needed for a new AUMF); see
Daskal, supra note 224, at 143 (explaining potential considerations in the drafting of a new
AUMF).
229. Brooks et. al., supra note 226 (listing relevant principles to the drafting of a new
AUMF for engaging against ISIS); see Daskal, supra note 224 (exploring ways to draft a new
AUMF for ISIS).
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relevant considerations applicable to an AUMF sunset provision.230
Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, a State may only exercise its
right to self-defense only “until the Security Council has taken
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”231
This poses the question of when a State’s right to self-defense
ceases.232 The most generous timeframe given among the seven
proposed AUMFs is a sunset provision of three years after the date of
enactment provided by Senate Joint Resolution 42.233 It would be
difficult to discern when the United Nations has taken actions
sufficient to override the United States’ stake in its own self-defense
or the coalition’s collective self-defense.234 Indeed, it is unclear
whether the United Nations would have to simply take measures or
whether those measures would have to be proven successful in order
to terminate the state’s right to self-defense.235 A sunset provision
may need to take into account this limitation under international
law.236 Otherwise, the situation may arise where the President has
authority under US law to continue engagement but no authority
under international law.237
C. Geographic Limitation: The Bounds of Engagement
Of the new AUMFs proposed, only two have provisions
articulating a geographic limitation to engagement against ISIS.238
House Joint Resolution 125 proposes that “authority . . . shall be
confined to the territory of the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian Arab
230. Brooks et. al., supra note 226 (listing principles needed for a new AUMF); see
Daskal, supra note 224, at 136-37 (discussing the legal needs with regards to a new AUMF).
231. U.N. Charter art. 51.
232. Id.
233. S.J. Res. 42, 113th Cong. (2013-2014).
234. See Brooks, supra note 226 (listing principles needed for a new AUMF); Vladeck,
supra note 224 (discussing the legal needs with regards to a new AUMF); see also U.N.
Charter art. 51 (making no mention of when a country’s right to self-defense ceases); U.N.
Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
235. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (making no mention of when a country’s right to selfdefense ceases); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
236. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (laying out the exceptions for the prohibition on use of
force and making no mention of when a right to self-defense would cease); see also U.N.
Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
237. See U.N. Charter art. 51 (listing the two self-defense exceptions to the prohibition
against use of force); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
238. See S.J. Res. 44, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014); H.R.J. Res. 125, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014)
(proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); Weed, supra note 192, at 13 (laying
out AUMFs proposed by Congress).
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Republic.”239 However, under this AUMF, the limitation would not
apply to foreign military training activities.240 The second AUMF
containing a provision is Senate Joint Resolution 44, which would
also confine the authorization to Iraq and Syria.241 However, as
articulated above, there may be geographic limitations to United
States involvement imposed by international law.242 While Senate
Joint Resolution 44 and House Joint Resolution 125 allow for
engagement within Syrian territory, the United Nations has not as of
the publication of this Comment.243
While Iraq has consented to international assistance in fighting
ISIS, Syria has not given consent.244 The authorization to violate
Syrian sovereignty would thus have to be authorized by the United
Nations.245 Indeed, Senate Joint Resolution 44 not only authorizes the
use of force against Syria but clarifies that “[n]othing in this
resolution shall be construed as . . . authorizing support for force in
support of, or in cooperation with, the national government of Syria . .
. or its security services.”246 Thus, any authorized engagement under
Senate Joint Resolution 44 would be by definition adverse to the
Syrian government.247 Unlike House Joint Resolution 125, Senate
Joint Resolution 44 requires that the United States act in conjunction
with an international coalition.248 This proposed AUMF is
preoccupied with maintaining the international character of the
239. H.R.J. Res. 125 § 2(b) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS);
see Weed, supra note 192, at 13 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress).
240. H.R.J. Res. 125 § 2(c) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS);
see Weed, supra note 192, at 13 (discussing limitations on use of military force in AUMFs
proposed by Congress).
241. S.J. Res. 44 § 2(a) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); see
Weed, supra note 192, at 13 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress).
242 See supra Part I.
243. S.J. Res. 44 § 2(a) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); H.R.J.
Res. 125 § 2(b) (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); see Weed, supra
note 192 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress).
244. See Deeks, supra note 47. See generally Weed, supra note 192 (laying out AUMFs
proposed by Congress); U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
245. See U.N. Charter, art. 2, ¶ 4; see also U.N. Charter art. 51.
246. S.J. Res. 44, 113th Cong. § 6(1) (2014); see Weed, supra note 192, at 14 (laying out
AUMFs proposed by Congress).
247. See S.J. Res. 44 (proposing an authorization for use of force against ISIS); Weed,
supra note 192, at 14 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress).
248. Compare S.J. Res. 44 § 2(a) (requiring that the United States act in conjunction
with an international coalition), with H.R.J. Res. 125, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2014) (proposing an
alternative AUMF); see Weed, supra note 192, at 16 (laying out AUMFs proposed by
Congress).
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engagement against ISIS. The use of the international coalition helps
the United States retain its argument that engagement may be legal
under customary international law, even without a United Nations
resolution.249 However, while there may be policy reasons for
sanctioning this adverse use of force in Syria, it might not pass legal
muster under international standards discussed in Part I.250
D. The International Coalition: “The Enemy of my Enemy”
The legality of these proposed AUMFs may also depend on
whether the United States relied on a collective self-defense argument
for international legal justification.251 If so, cooperation with other
countries would be required under international law by definition.252
However, it is unclear whether some of these proposed AUMFs
would require cooperation with other States or whether the AUMFs
simply presume it.253 For example, the international provision under
House Resolution 5415 states that the President may use force “with
the close consultation, coordination, and cooperation with NATO and
regional allies.”254 This is a narrower view of the requisite
international cooperation than the one in other proposed AUMFs,
which ask for United States cooperation with the broader international
community including allies in the Middle East.255 A UN Security
Council Resolution may determine this to be an engagement of global
importance meriting the most expansive international involvement
possible.256 Thus, a Security Council resolution, if produced, could be
249. Compare S.J. Res. 44 § 2(a) (requiring that the United States act in conjunction
with an international coalition), with H.R.J. Res. 125 § 2(a) (proposing an alternative AUMF);
see Weed, supra note 192, at 16 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress).
250. See generally supra Part I (discussing international law provisions applicable to the
United States engagement against ISIS).
251. See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text; see generally supra Part I.B.
252. See supra Part I.B.
253. Compare S.J. Res. 44, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2014)(requiring that the United States
act in conjunction with an international coalition), with H.R.J. Res. 125, 113th Cong. § 2(a)
(2014) (proposing an alternative AUMF); see Weed, supra note 192, at 16 (laying out AUMFs
proposed by Congress).
254. H.R. 5415, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2014).
255. Compare H.R. 5415 § 2(a) (requiring that the United States act in conjunction with
NATO allies), with H.R.J. Res. 125 §2(a) (proposing an alternative AUMF); see Weed, supra
note 192, at 16 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress).
256. Compare S.C. Res. 2178, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2178 ¶¶ 1, 15 (Sep. 24, 2014) (detailing
the UN’s condemnation of violent extremism and deeming it an issue of international
concern), with H.R. 5415 § 2(a) (requiring only that the United States act in conjunction with
NATO allies).
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in tension with a US AUMF that limits the United States’
international partnerships.257
The only resolution that takes into account the possibility of a
UN Security Council Resolution is House Joint Resolution 128.258
This proposed AUMF would track the orders of a UN Security
Council Resolution and authorize the President to act accordingly.259
Under House Joint Resolution 128, if there is no UN Security Council
Resolution, the President would be limited to military engagement
that does not involve American boots on the ground.260 Moreover, the
reporting requirements under House Joint Resolution 128 would be
different depending on whether or not there is a UN Security Council
Resolution.261 If there is none, the President would have to show that
the United States sought but did not receive a Security Council
resolution authorizing the use of force.262 Additionally, the President
would have to 1) show that the United States is still working to build
a broad international coalition to counter ISIS and 2) present a
strategy before Congress for combatting ISIS.263
All proposed AUMFs would have to pass muster under US law
as well as international law.264 In addition to the international
concerns articulated above, there are several other US policy
questions these AUMFs must deal with.265 For example, an AUMF
would have to decide whether the preceding 2001 and 2002 AUMFs
should be repealed.266 Another concern would be whether this
authorization of force should be limited to ISIS in its current form or
whether it would grant authorization for any changes in ISIS’s
structure.267 For instance, new AUMFs might consider whether an

257. Compare S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 257, ¶¶ 1, 15 (detailing the UN’s
condemnation of violent extremism and deeming it an issue of international concern), with
H.R. 5415, 113th Cong. § 2(a) (2014) (requiring only that the United States act in conjunction
with NATO allies).
258. H.R.J. Res. 128, 113th Cong. § 3 (2014); see Weed, supra note 192, at 12.
259. See H.R.J. Res. 128 § 3(a)(2); Weed, supra note 192, at 12.
260. See H.R.J. Res. 128 § 4(a); Weed, supra note 192, at 19.
261. H.R.J. Res. 128 §§ 3, 4; see Weed, supra note 192, at 14-15.
262. See H.R.J. Res. 128 § 4(b); Weed, supra note 192, at 14-15.
263. See H.R.J. Res. 128 § 4(a)(1)(B), (b)(2); Weed, supra note 192, at 14-15.
264. See U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4 (detailing U.S. obligations under international law);
Brooks, supra note 226, ¶ 5.
265. See generally Brooks, supra note 226 (suggesting principles for drafting new
AUMFs; Weed, supra note 192 (laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress).
266. See Brooks, supra note 226, ¶ 4; Weed, supra note 192, at 9.
267. See Brooks, supra note 226, ¶ 1; Weed, supra note 192, at 7-8.
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AUMF should authorize engagement against ISIS if they cross
borders and infiltrate other States aside from Iraq and Syria.268
There are also some questions that arise related to the precedent
this AUMF will set.269 For instance, it is unclear whether a new
AUMF would repudiate the President’s original position when he
cited the 2001 AUMF as legal authority.270 The way in which
Congress handles the passing of a new AUMF and the way in which
the United States complies with international law could determine
much of the jus ad bellum jurisprudence going forward for
combatting terrorist groups and non-state actors.271
In summary, a new AUMF would consider several issues such as
whether a sunset provision should be included and whether
developments in the US international law justification should be
considered.272 As of the publication of this Comment, only House
Joint Resolution 128 takes into account the possibility of a Security
Council resolution.273 Part III will discuss what the best course of
action would be for the United States so that it stays true to its
obligations under international and US law.
III. LEGAL LEGITIMACY AND FUTURE QUESTIONS
Abram Chayes, a Kennedy-era legal scholar, spoke of the Cuban
Missile crisis in the following terms, equally applicable to the
engagement against ISIS:
We were armed, necessarily, with something more substantial
than a lawyer’s brief. But though it would not have been enough
merely to have the law on our side, it is not irrelevant which side
the law was on. The effective deployment of force, the appeal for
world support, to say nothing of the ultimate judgment of history,
all depend in significant degree on the reality and coherence of
the case in law for our action. It is worthwhile, I think, to set out
that legal case and to examine some of its implications.274

268. See Brooks, supra note 226, ¶ 2; see also Weed, supra note 192, at 8.
269. See generally supra Part II.B.
270. See supra Part II.B.
271. See supra Part I.
272. See generally supra Part II.
273. See H.R.J. Res. 128, 113th Cong. §§ 3, 4 (2014); Weed, supra note 192, at 12-13
(laying out AUMFs proposed by Congress).
274. Abram Chayes, Law and the Quarantine of Cuba, 41 FOREIGN AFF. 550, 550
(1963) (discussing the legality of events surrounding the Cuban Missile Crisis).
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In keeping with Chayes’ philosophy, the legitimacy and legality
of the United States engagement against ISIS is not only important for
its own sake, but as a strategy to bolster the effectiveness of
international relations.275 The US response to ISIS is important
because the extent to which the United States complies with its own
law will serve as a litmus test for United States’ integrity in the face
of war.276 More broadly, the adherence of the international
community to fundamental principles of international law will
reinforce the legitimacy of rules established to keep the world in order
during a time of hostility.277 Considering the tools available in the
executive branch’s toolbox as laid out in Parts I and II, Part III will
make a normative argument for which justification under international
and US law is most appropriate for the engagement against ISIS.
Barring certain circumstantial changes discussed below, the
international law theory of collective self-defense is most appropriate.
A. International Law
The appropriate justification under international law for
engaging against ISIS depends on whether the United States intends
to seek a Security Council resolution, and whether that resolution
could survive a veto by one of the permanent five members.278
Without a resolution, the United States would still have a strong
collective self-defense argument and could probably proceed in Iraq
under Article 51 without Security Council authorization.279 However,
the United States’ actions would be confined to Iraq.280 For any action
in Syria, the United States would need to pursue Security Council
authorization in order to be in accord with international law.281
Without authorization from the Security Council to engage in Syria,
the United States would need to rely on customary international law
as the legal basis for engaging ISIS in Syria by arming the Syrian
rebels.282
275. See generally supra Part I.
276. See generally supra Part II.
277. See generally supra Part II.
NATIONS,
http://www.un.org/
278. See
The
Security
Council,
UNITED
en/sc/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2015) (describing the veto power of the five permanent members of
the Security Council); see also U.N. Charter art. 51.
279. See supra Part I.B; U.N. Charter art. 51.
280. See supra Part I.B; U.N. Charter art. 51.
281. See generally supra Part I; U.N. Charter art. 51.
282. See supra Part I; see also U.N. Charter art. 51.
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First, it is important to establish why an individual self-defense
argument is unlikely to be appropriate in this case.283 While the
United States’ national security interests are at play, it likely has not
suffered a sufficient “armed attack” as required for an individual selfdefense argument under Article 51.284 Indeed, the murders of the
American journalists and personnel abroad allow for some argument
to be made about the United States suffering an “armed attack” by
ISIS.285
However, it is unclear whether this is sufficient to rise to the
standard of an “armed attack” as laid out by the Nicaragua case.286
Even if it were, the United States would be bound to respond
proportionally.287 If the “armed attack” in this case is the killing of a
number of American journalists, the American air strikes, arming of
Syrian rebels, and forming of an international coalition arguably are
not proportional responses.288 If the United States relied on an
individual self-defense argument, it would likely be in violation of jus
in bello.289 Given the strong transnational policy reasons for engaging
against a violent force like ISIS, an argument of collective selfdefense under Article 51 would be more appropriate.290
While the United States has its own national security interests
that may motivate engagement against ISIS, that does not keep this
from being an instance of collective rather than individual selfdefense.291 As discussed in Part I, the engagement in Iraq against ISIS
has the trappings of a collective self-defense situation because Iraq
has consented to the involvement of other nations in quelling a rogue
non-state actor.292 Indeed, the United States is only one of many
nations involved in engaging against ISIS.293 Since there is no UN
283. See generally supra Part I.C; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
284. See supra Part I.C; U.N. Charter art. 51.
285. See U.N. Charter art. 51; see, e.g., Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing the beheading
of Peter Kassig by ISIS); Carter & Fantz, supra note 95 (discussing the brutality of ISIS
violence against American journalist Steven Sotloff).
286. See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (analyzing the definition of “armed
attack” in Nicaragua).
287. See Denver, supra note 107, at 325 (explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline
Test); see also Kearley, supra note 107, at 174 (outlining the history of the Caroline Test).
288. See Denver, supra note 107 (explaining the basic tenets of the Caroline Test); see
also Kearley, supra note 107 (outlining the history of the Caroline Test).
289. See supra Part I.C.
290. See supra Part I.B.
291. See supra Part I.B.
292. See supra Part I.B.
293. See supra Part I.B.
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Security Council resolution in effect permitting the entire
international coalition to engage against ISIS, each state would have
to come up with its own self-defense argument if this were not an
instance of collective self-defense.294
If defined as an instance of collective self-defense, engaging
against ISIS would be justified under Nicaragua because an “armed
attack” against Iraq has occurred.295 The “armed attacks” are clear:
ISIS has overtaken cities, engaged in human rights violations, and
violently killed civilians.296 Moreover, the military measures taken by
the United States and the international coalition in response to ISIS’s
gross violations of international law are likely to be considered
necessary and proportional.297 The violence of ISIS and the damage it
has inflicted on Iraq likely suffice to say that it is necessary to
respond. The response is proportional because the United States-led
international coalition has primarily used air strikes in Iraq to target
key leaders. Since the United States has yet to engage ISIS with boots
on the ground and has thus far only used air strikes, the response
likely meets the proportionality requirement under international
law.298
Defining the engagement against ISIS as an instance of
collective self-defense would not erase the role of the UN Security
Council.299 Under Article 51, the inherent right of self-defense here
would only last until the United Nations took measures to restore the
peace.300 The exercise of the inherent right to collective self-defense
by the international coalition—and therefore the United States—
would not undermine the involvement of the United Nations.301 It
would also not leave the international community at the mercy of a
Security Council veto, potentially by Russia or China.302 This would
294. See supra Part I.C.
295. See supra notes 296-97.
296. See U.N. Charter art. 51; see, e.g., Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing the beheading
of Peter Kassig by ISIS); Carter & Fantz, supra note 95 (discussing the brutality of ISIS
violence against American journalist Steven Sotloff).
297. See U.N. Charter art. 51; Denver, supra note 107, at 5 (explaining the basic tenets
of the Caroline Test); see, e.g., Abdallah, supra note 95 (showing the beheading of Peter
Kassig by ISIS); Carter & Fantz, supra note 95 (discussing the brutality of ISIS violence
against American journalist Steven Sotloff).
298. Denver, supra note 107. See generally supra Part I.
299. See generally supra Part I.
300. U.N. Charter art. 51.
301. See id. See generally supra Part I.
302. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
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also still leave open the question of whether engagement against ISIS
in Syria—or in territories beyond Iraq—can be justified under
international law.303
One answer to this question would rely on customary
international law.304 For geopolitical reasons involving a Russian
alliance with the Syrian regime, the Security Council would likely
veto a resolution authorizing the arming of Syrian rebels.305 In order
to argue that the international coalition can arm the Syrian rebels, the
international coalition would have show that under customary
international law, the engagement is legal.306 This argument would be
made stronger if the coalition could show as a factual matter that
arming the Syrian rebels is a compelling if not necessary means to
defeating ISIS in Iraq.307
Moreover, to be justified under customary international law, the
engagement would have to meet two criteria.308 First, it would have to
be ubiquitously agreed to—as is likely the case by the mere presence
of the international coalition against ISIS. Second, the members of the
international coalition would have to be acting in a way they believe
is legal.309 As of November 12, 2014, the countries in the
international coalition engaging against ISIS have taken active
measures ranging from air strikes to the distribution of humanitarian
aid.310 Since a large part of the international community acquiesced to
engaging against ISIS without an explicit grant from the Security
Council, it is likely that they believe their behavior to be legal.311
Moreover, if States believe themselves to be acting in collective
self-defense of Iraq, they would be acting under the color of law,
believing to be justified under Article 51.312 If the engagement of the
303. See generally supra Part I.
304. See generally supra Part I.
305. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text.
306. See supra Part I.B-D.
307. See supra Part I.B-D.
308. See Customary IHL, International Committee of the Red Cross, https://www.icrc.
org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_in_asofcuin [hereinafter Customary IHL] (explaining the
two main elements of customary international law); see also Statute of the International Court
of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter
I.C.J. Statute].
309. See Customary IHL, supra note 308 (laying out the elements of customary
international law); see also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, ¶ 1(b), June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33 U.N.T.S. 933.
310. See supra Part I.
311. See generally supra Part I; I.C.J. Statute, supra note 308, art. 38, ¶ 1(b).
312. See I.C.J. Statute art. 38(1)(b); U.N. Charter art. 51.
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international coalition were illegal, the UN Security Council would
have condemned the response.313 Thus, it is likely that the
engagement against ISIS is legal under customary international
law.314 As discussed above, if there is a strong argument for the
necessity of arming Syrian rebels in order to combat ISIS in Iraq, the
United States and the international community’s arming of the Syrian
rebels may also be legal under customary international law.315 As
Professor Harold Koh would call it, justifying the engagement against
ISIS in Syria might be an example of “transnational legal process.”316
In this case, international law governs not with treaties formally
negotiated, but with “the dynamic interaction of private and public
actors in a variety of national and international fora to generate norms
and construct national and global interests.”317
B. Legal Justification under US Law
The 2001 AUMF serves as insufficient statutory justification for
the United States’ engagement against ISIS.318 Even if it is factually
determined that ISIS and al-Qaeda are linked enough to both come
under the 2001 AUMF, it would be inconsistent to argue that the
President needs no further grant of authority to combat ISIS.319 This is
because, under international law, the President would need renewed
Security Council authorization if the United States were not acting
under one of the Article 51 exceptions.320 Since fighting ISIS would
involve a separate military enterprise than the one the United States
used to combat al-Qaeda, the United States would need separate
Security Council authorization.321 It would be inconsistent if the
United States argued that it needed no further statutory authority from
Congress because ISIS is part of an “ongoing conflict” but
simultaneously asked for a separate grant of authority from the

313. See I.C.J. Statute art. 38(1)(b); U.N. Charter art. 51.
314. See I.C.J. Statute art. 38(1)(b); U.N. Charter art. 51.
315. See I.C.J. Statute art. 38(1)(b); U.N. Charter art. 51.
316. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. State Dep’t, Remarks at Georgetown
University Law Center (Oct. 17, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.state.gov/s/l/
releases/remarks/199319.htm) (discussing the incentives that motivate international law).
317. Id.
318. See supra Part II.
319. See supra Part II.
320. See supra Part I.A; U.N. Charter art. 51.
321. See supra Part I.A; U.N. Charter art. 51.
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Security Council.322 For these reasons, the use of the existing AUMF
could potentially lead the United States to adopt this inconsistent legal
standpoint.323 Either that or the United States would be forced to
argue that it is engaging against ISIS on grounds of individual selfdefense and thus requires no further UN authorization.324 This
argument is likely to fail for the reasons laid out in Part III.A.325
Congress’ new AUMF would need to be consistent with
international law.326 Moreover, the existence of a UN resolution
authorizing engagement against ISIS remains a moving target as of
the publication of this Comment.327 Out of the AUMFs drafted by
Congress, House Joint Resolution 128 is the AUMF most likely to
withstand scrutiny under international law because it tracks the
existence of a UN Resolution.328 It also leaves room for the United
States to argue that it is engaging against ISIS as a matter of
collective self-defense.329 One of the main issues with House Joint
Resolution 128 would be that it gives a broad grant of power to the
President, enabling him to engage against ISIS in the Levant
generally.330
This may lead to a situation where the President has authority
under US law to engage against ISIS in Syria without having
international authority.331 This is precisely why the collective selfdefense argument under international law is the one best suited to the
United States in this situation.332 Practically, it would leave open the
door for the United States to argue that engagement in Syria is either
necessary for collective self-defense or justified under customary
international law.333
If House Joint Resolution 128 were coupled with an
international law justification that required Security Council
authorization, the President’s US law authorization would then be in
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
art. 51.
331.
332.
333.

See generally supra Part I.
See generally supra Part I.
See supra Part I; see also supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Parts I.A, II.A.
See supra Part I.A.
See H.R.J. Res. 128, 113th Cong. (2014); see also supra Part III.A.
See supra Part I.B; see also U.N. Charter art. 51.
See H.R.J. Res. 128, 113th Cong. (2014); see also supra Part III.A; U.N. Charter
See generally supra Parts I, III.A. See also U.N. Charter art. 51.
See supra Parts I, III.A; see also U.N. Charter art. 51.
See supra Parts I, III.A; see also U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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tension with international law.334 If the Security Council decided not
to authorize engagement in Syria, a question of legislative supremacy
would arise.335 If Congress gave the President a broad grant of power
to engage in the Levant generally (including Syria), it is unclear
whether international law would trump US law.336 This may be a
problematic situation because it would lead to a crisis of legitimacy
for the Security Council and it would make the United States appear
to be violating international law with impunity.337
Finally, as discussed in Part II, any new AUMF would need to
take into account compliance with other realms of international laws
of war such as jus in bello.338 House Joint Resolution 128 is one
example of an AUMF that would incorporate the language of
“necessary and appropriate” force, which triggers US compliance
with international law.339 Congress should ensure consistency with
international law by authorizing “necessary and appropriate force.”340
This would constitute an implicit authorization for the President to
use those means of force that are “fundamental and accepted incidents
of war by universal agreement and practice.”341 This language would
mean that the United States would be bound to comply with
international treaties like the UN Charter, but also customary
international law.342 This would be a US incorporation of
international law regarding principles of jus in bello like
proportionality, precaution, and distinction.343 It would also act as a
legal stopper against violations of the laws of war, reinforcing the
consistency between United States law and international
obligations.344
In conclusion, ISIS presents unique problems for the United
States’ jus ad bellum jurisprudence.345 It will also set important
precedents because the United States engagement against ISIS
334. See H.R.J. Res. 128, 113th Cong. (2014); see also U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
335. See generally supra Parts I, III.A.
336. See generally supra Parts I, III.A.
337. See supra Parts I, III.A; see also U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
338. See supra Parts II, III.A; see also U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
339. See H.R.J. Res. 128, 113th Cong. (2014); see also supra Part III.A.
340. See Brooks, supra note 226, ¶ 5. See generally Daskal & Vladeck, supra note 224
(discussing the legal needs with regards to a new AUMF).
341. Brooks, supra note 226, ¶ 5.
342. See supra Part III.A; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
343. See supra Part III.A; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
344. See supra Part III.A; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
345. See supra Part III.A; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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represents a turning point in how US foreign policy deals with nonstate actors in international crises.346 How the United States responds
in this instance will also have important implications for how
Presidential war powers are construed and how the United States
incorporates international law into its own federal law going forward.
Accordingly, the AUMF passed by Congress should take into account
the argument the United States makes to the international community
in justifying its engagement against ISIS.

346. See supra Part I; U.N. Charter art. 2, ¶ 4.
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